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Abstract
Self-testing is a method to characterise an arbitrary quantum system based only on its classical
input-output correlations, and plays an important role in device-independent quantum information
processing as well as quantum complexity theory. Prior works on self-testing require the assumption
that the system’s state is shared among multiple parties that only perform local measurements and
cannot communicate. Here, we replace the setting of multiple non-communicating parties, which is
difficult to enforce in practice, by a single computationally bounded party. Specifically, we construct
a protocol that allows a classical verifier to robustly certify that a single computationally bounded
quantum device must have prepared a Bell pair and performed single-qubit measurements on it, up
to a change of basis applied to both the device’s state and measurements. This means that under
computational assumptions, the verifier is able to certify the presence of entanglement, a property
usually closely associated with two separated subsystems, inside a single quantum device. To achieve
this, we build on techniques first introduced by Brakerski et al. (2018) and Mahadev (2018) which
allow a classical verifier to constrain the actions of a quantum device assuming the device does not
break post-quantum cryptography.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Quantum computation theory
Keywords and phrases Quantum computing, quantum cryptography, device-independence, self-
testing, post-quantum cryptography
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.19
Related Version A full version of the paper is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.09161.
Funding Tony Metger : supported by the ETH Foundation through the Excellence Scholarship &
Opportunity Programme, and the IQIM, an NSF Physics Frontiers Center (NSF Grant PHY-1125565)
with support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (GBMF-12500028).
Thomas Vidick: supported by NSF CAREER Grant CCF-1553477, AFOSR YIP award number
FA9550-16-1-0495, a CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholar award, MURI Grant FA9550-18-1-0161, and the
IQIM, an NSF Physics Frontiers Center (NSF Grant PHY-1125565) with support of the Gordon
and Betty Moore Foundation (GBMF-12500028).
Acknowledgements We thank Andrea Coladangelo, Andru Gheorghiu, Anand Natarajan, and Tina
Zhang for helpful discussions; Andrea Coladangelo, Andru Gheorghiu, Urmila Mahadev, and Akihiro
Mizutani for comments on the manuscript; and Lídia del Rio for pointing out the reference [6]. This
work was carried out while Tony Metger was a visiting student researcher at the Department of
Computing and Mathematical Sciences at Caltech.
1 Introduction
The device-independent approach to quantum information processing treats quantum devices
as black boxes which we can interact with classically to observe their input-output correlations.
Based solely on these correlations and the assumption that quantum mechanics is correct,
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the goal is to prove statements about the devices, e.g., to show that they can be used for
secure quantum key distribution (see e.g. [24]) or delegated quantum computation (see
e.g. [32]). At a fundamental level, this provides a theory-of-computation approach to the
study of classical signatures of quantum mechanics and their use as a “leash” to control and
characterize quantum devices.
Self-testing is arguably the most effective method in device-independent quantum in-
formation processing. The goal in self-testing is to characterise the quantum state and
measurements of multiple black-box quantum devices using only their classical input-output
correlations. In analogy to the setting of interactive proof systems, the classical party
observing the input-output correlations is sometimes called the verifier, and the black-box
quantum devices are called provers. More specifically, the verifier can interact with multiple
quantum provers by sending (classical) questions as inputs and receiving (classical) answers
as outputs. The provers can share any (finite-dimensional) entangled quantum state at the
start of the interaction and are computationally unbounded; however, it is assumed that after
having received the verifier’s questions, the provers can no longer communicate. Based on
the question-answer correlations, the verifier would like to deduce that the provers must have
shared a certain initial state and performed certain measurements on it, up to a local change
of basis on each prover’s Hilbert space. We will describe this scenario in more detail in
Section 1.1. We emphasize that self-testing is a uniquely quantum phenomenon: for classical
devices, there is simply a function that is implemented by the device, and it is not meaningful
to ask how the function is implemented “on the inside”. In contrast, for quantum devices, in
certain cases knowledge of the function (the observed input-output behaviour) implies an
essentially unique realization in terms of a quantum state and measurements on it.
The term self-testing was introduced by Mayers and Yao in [24] in the context of proofs
of security for quantum key distribution, but the notion was already present in earlier works
[34, 29]. For a review covering a large number of different self-testing protocols, as well as
applications such as randomness expansion and delegated quantum computation, see [35]. In
addition to more practical applications, self-testing has also proved to be a powerful tool in
quantum complexity theory for the study of multi-prover interactive proof systems in the
quantum setting and is at the heart of the recent characterisation of the complexity class
MIP∗ [21].
The starting point for our work is the observation that, while the model of non-
communicating quantum provers used in existing self-testing results is appealing in theory,
it is difficult to enforce this non-communication assumption in practice. Motivated by the
many applications of self-testing in quantum cryptography (e.g. device-independent quantum
key distribution) and complexity theory, we are compelled to search for protocols that allow
for a self-testing-like certification of a single untrusted quantum device.
Self-testing protocols in the multi-prover setting are typically based on the violation
of Bell inequalities [3], for which the non-communication assumption is necessary.1 Hence,
different techniques or additional assumptions are necessary when considering the single-device
scenario. What could a “computational Bell inequality” look like?
In this paper we give an answer to this question by constructing a self-testing protocol
for a single computationally bounded quantum device. Specifically, the only assumptions
required are the correctness of quantum mechanics and that the prover does not have the
1 Another approach is to base the self-testing statement on non-contextuality inequalities [5, 6]. The
violation of non-contextuality inequalities is a uniquely quantum phenomenon that is similar to the
violation of Bell inequalities, with the advantage that it only requires a single quantum device and
therefore no non-communication assumption. The downside of this approach is that it places additional
assumptions, such as memory constraints and compatibility relations between measurements, on the
quantum device, limiting its suitability for practical cryptographic applications.
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ability to break the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption [31], a common assumption
in post-quantum cryptography, during the protocol execution (whereas breaking the LWE
assumption after the end of the protocol is allowed). Our protocol is a three-round interaction
between a classical verifier and a quantum prover, at the end of which the verifier decides to
either “accept” or “reject” the prover. Informally, the guarantee provided by the protocol is
the following:
I Theorem (Informal). A prover’s strategy in the protocol is described by a quantum state
and the measurements that the prover makes on the state to obtain the (classical) answers
received by the verifier. If a computationally bounded prover is accepted by the verifier with
probability 1− ε, then there exists an isometry V such that for a universal constant c > 0
and under the isometry V :
1. the prover’s state is O(εc)-close (in trace distance) to a Bell pair,
2. (a subset of) the prover’s measurements are O(εc)-close to single-qubit measurements in
the computational or Hadamard basis, where the measurement bases are chosen by the
verifier. Here, “closeness” is measured in a distance measure suitable for measurements
acting on a state.
We emphasize that the theorem not only guarantees the preparation of an entangled state by
the prover, but also the implementation of specific measurements on it. As such, it provides
a complete analogue of foundational self-testing results for the CHSH inequality [34, 25].
The proof of our main result builds on techniques introduced in recent works [23, 8, 19] to
allow a classical verifier to leverage post-quantum cryptography to control a computationally
bounded quantum prover. Because they are relevant for understanding the proof of our
results, we now give a brief overview of these works and explain their relation to self-testing.
In [23], Mahadev gives the first protocol to classically verify a delegated quantum
computation with a single untrusted quantum prover. The central ingredient in Mahadev’s
verification protocol is a “measurement protocol” that allows the verifier to force the prover
to report classical outcomes obtained by performing certain measurements on a quantum
state that the prover has “committed to” using classical information. The main guarantee of
the measurement protocol is this: if the prover is accepted in the protocol, there exists a
quantum state such that the distribution over the prover’s answers could have been produced
by performing the requested measurements on this state. In other words, all of the prover’s
answers must be self-consistent in the sense that they could have originated from performing
different measurements on (copies of) the same quantum state.
To verify a quantum computation, the statement that the prover’s answers are consistent
with measurements on a quantum state is sufficient, as the existence of a quantum state
with the right properties can certify the outcome of the quantum computation (this is due to
Kitaev’s “circuit-to-Hamiltonian” construction, which we do not explain here). However, in
this work we seek to make a stronger statement: we want to certify that the prover actually
constructed the desired quantum state and performed the desired measurements on it (up
to an isometry). While the honest prover in Mahadev’s protocol does indeed construct the
desired quantum state, the protocol does not guarantee that an arbitrary prover must do, too.
Hence, our self-testing protocol is stronger in the sense that it allows for a more stringent
characterisation of the prover’s actions, namely its actual states and measurements.2 To
emphasize the difference, we note that the guarantee of Mahadev’s protocol does not directly
2 This comes at the cost that we are only able to certify Bell pairs, while Mahadev’s measurement protocol
works for measurements on any state.
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imply that a successful prover must have performed any quantum computation; the guarantee
is only that, if the correct state preparation and measurements were to be performed, the
outcome would be as claimed by the prover.
Another closely related work is that of Brakerski et al. [8], who give a protocol between a
classical verifier and a quantum prover that allows the verifier to generate certified information-
theoretic randomness, again assuming that the prover does not break the LWE assumption; in
other words, their protocol generates information-theoretic randomness from a computational
assumption. For this, the authors show that two of the prover’s measurements must be
maximally incompatible, as defined by a quantity that they call the “overlap”. Informally, one
can think of two maximally incompatible measurements as being close to a computational and
Hadamard basis measurement, up to some global change of basis. Hence, this result already
resembles self-testing in the sense that the verifier can make a statement about the actual
measurements used by the prover. In particular, it does serve as a “test of quantumness” for
the prover.
Building on [8] and using techniques from [23], Gheorghiu and Vidick construct a protocol
for a task that they call verifiable remote state preparation (RSP) [19]. They consider a set
of single-qubit pure states {|ψ1〉, . . . , |ψn〉}.3 Under the same LWE assumption as before, the
protocol enables the verifier to certify that the prover has prepared one of these states, up to
a global change of basis (i.e., some isometry V that is applied to all |ψi〉). More precisely,
the verifier cannot decide beforehand on a particular |ψi〉, but after executing the protocol,
the verifier knows which |ψi〉 the prover has prepared, and the distribution over i can be
made uniform. The prover, on the other hand, does not know which |ψi〉 he has prepared.
This result resembles a self-testing statement even more than that of [8] because it
explicitly characterises a family of single-qubit quantum states, one of which is certified to
be present in the prover’s space. However, it differs from a standard self-testing statement in
that it is defined for a family of states, not an individual state: because the prover’s isometry
V is arbitrary, any individual state |ψi〉 can be mapped to another arbitrary state. Hence,
what is certified in RSP is not any individual state, but the relationships (e.g., orthogonality)
between different states in some family. Alternatively, one can also take the view that RSP
characterises the relationships between the prover’s states and measurements. We return to
this issue in more detail in Section 1.1. The idea of certifying a family of states has also been
considered by Cojocaru et al. [12], who call this notion “blind self-testing”. They analyze a
different protocol under a restricted adversarial model and conjecture that their protocol
yields similar guarantees as [19] for single-qubit states and tensor products of single-qubit
states.
This lengthy overview of previous works makes explicit a progression towards the task
that we tackle here, that of genuine self-testing of a single quantum device. We note that
this presentation clearly benefits from hindsight, and that none of the cited works mentions
any relation to self-testing; indeed, the results are too weak to be used in this setting.
In particular, none of the previous works provides a sufficiently strong guarantee on the
measurements performed by the quantum device and goes beyond the setting of a single
qubit, which is arguably the main technical challenge. Indeed, moving from a single-qubit
state to an entangled two-qubit state means that the verifier has to enforce a tensor product
structure on the prover’s space, which is one of the main difficulties in our soundness proof
([27, Section 4]). On a technical level, it requires the certification of compatibility relations
3 The protocol in [19] is designed for a specific set of ten pure states that are useful for delegated quantum
computation, but for the purposes of this overview it is not important which specific states these are.
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between different measurements meant to act on different qubits. Additionally, having two
qubits instead of one prevents us from using Jordan’s lemma, a standard tool in self-testing
also used in [19], to characterise the prover’s measurements; in [27, Section 4,7], we show how
to characterise the prover’s measurements using a different method starting with a partial
characterisation of the prover’s measurements, using that to partially characterise the prover’s
states, which in turn is used for a stronger partial characterisation of the measurements, etc.,
until we reach the full statement that shows that the prover makes single-qubit measurements
on a Bell pair.
1.1 Self-testing in the multi- and single-prover settings
In this section, we give a brief overview of the standard multi-prover self-testing scenario,
and explain how it can be extended to a single prover. For more details on the multi-prover
scenario, see [35] or [33, Chapter 7]. For simplicity, let us consider the case of two provers
A and B, with Hilbert spaces HA and HB, respectively. Hence, the total Hilbert space is
HA ⊗HB . The verifier interacts with A and B by sending questions and receiving answers.
The question-answer correlations can be described by a family of probability distributions
{p(a, b|x, y)}x,y, where for each choice of questions x and y sent to A and B, respectively,
p(a, b|x, y) is a probability distribution over their answers a and b. We say that a quantum
state |ψ〉AB ∈ HA ⊗ HB is compatible with the correlations p(a, b|x, y) if there are local
measurements {P (a)x }a on HA for every input x, and {Q(b)y }b on HB for every input y, that
realise the correlations p(a, b|x, y), i.e., p(a, b|x, y) = 〈ψ|P (a)x ⊗Q(b)y |ψ〉AB for all x, y, a, b.
I Definition 1 (Self-testing of states, informal). The correlations p(a, b|x, y) self-test a state
|φ〉AB if for any state |ψ〉AB compatible with these correlations, there exists a local isometry
V = VA ⊗ VB (with VA only acting on HA, and VB only acting on HB) such that V |ψ〉AB =
|φ〉AB |Aux〉 for some ancillary state |Aux〉.
A more operational view of this statement is that it must be possible to “extract” the
state |φ〉AB from |ψ〉AB only by performing local operations. The condition that the isometry
must be local is crucial: if we would allow a global isometry, we could map any state |ψ〉AB to
the desired state |φ〉AB . In the two-prover case, the notion of a local isometry is natural, since
the separation between the two provers induces a tensor product structure H = HA⊗HB on
the global Hilbert space H. In contrast, for a single prover no such tensor product structure
exists and we cannot define local isometries in a meaningful way.
In Definition 1, we only dealt with the provers’ state, not his measurements. A stronger
notion of self-testing is to characterise both the provers’ state and measurements. This is the
version of self-testing originally considered by Mayers and Yao [24], and we will see that it
can be meaningfully extended to the single-prover setting.
I Definition 2 (Self-testing of states and measurements, informal). The correlations p(a, b|x, y)
self-test a state |φ〉AB and measurements {M (a)x }, {N (b)y } if for any state |ψ〉AB and meas-
urements {P (a)x }, {Q(b)y } that realise the correlations p(a, b|x, y), there exists a local isometry
V = VA ⊗ VB such that
1. V |ψ〉AB = |φ〉AB |Aux〉,
2. V (P (a)x ⊗Q(b)y )|ψ〉AB =
(
(M (a)x ⊗N (b)y )|φ〉AB
)
|Aux〉, for some ancillary state |Aux〉.
The first condition is the same as in Definition 1. The second condition roughly says that
the “physical” measurements {P (a)x } and {Q(b)y } used by A and B, respectively, act on the
state |ψ〉AB in the same way that the desired measurements {M (a)x } and {N (b)y } act on the
desired state |φ〉AB .
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Self-testing of states and measurements still has meaning in the single-prover setting.
In this setting, one can imagine that the verifier sends both questions x and y to the same
prover, and the prover replies with two answers a and b. To compute his answers, the prover
prepares a quantum state |ψ〉 and, on inputs x, y, performs a measurement {P (a,b)x,y }a,b to
obtain answers a, b.
I Definition 3 (Self-testing for a single prover, informal). The correlations p(a, b|x, y) self-test
a state |φ〉 and measurements {K(a,b)x,y }a,b if for any state |ψ〉 and measurements {P (a,b)x,y }a,b
that realise the correlations p(a, b|x, y), there exists an isometry V such that
1. V |ψ〉 = |φ〉|Aux〉,






|Aux〉, for some ancillary state |Aux〉 ∈ H′.
This definition is rather informal because whenever the number of possible questions and
answers is fixed and independent of the security parameter (as is the case in this paper),
single-round question-answer correlations p(a, b|x, y) alone cannot be sufficient: a prover can
always succeed in the protocol simply by answering the verifier’s questions according to a
look-up table; such a prover is classical and does not actually perform any computation.
Therefore, our protocol will have multiple rounds of interaction between the verifier and
the prover: the questions and answers in the initial “setup rounds” will involve a public
key that scales with the security parameter; then, in the last round, the verifier observes
question-answer correlations p(a, b|x, y) similar to standard self-testing, i.e., with a fixed
question and answer length. Instead of using multi-round interaction, one could also try to
build a single-round protocol with questions that depend on the security parameter (e.g.,
the question would include a public key). A number of recent works have shown that under
the (quantum) random oracle assumption, the protocol for certifying the quantumness of a
prover from [8] and the verification protocol from [23] can be adapted to this single-round
setting [2, 11, 9]. We leave it for future work to investigate whether the interaction in our
protocol can also be removed with the random oracle assumption.
To obtain a statement that is more similar to the two-prover scenario, we consider the
stronger constraint that the desired measurements have a tensor product form K(a,b)x,y =
M
(a)
x ⊗ N (b)y . In particular, this means that answer a only depends on question x and b
only depends on y, and it enforces a natural tensor product structure on the prover’s space.
Specifically, we define Hilbert spaces HA,HB and H′ and deduce the existence of an isometry
V from the prover’s physical space H to HA ⊗HB ⊗H′ such that under the isometry, the
measurements operators P (a,b)x,y act on |ψ〉 in the same way that tensor product measurement
operators of the form M (a)x ⊗N (b)y act on |φ〉AB , where M (a)x acts only on HA, N (b)y acts only
on HB , and |φ〉AB is the state that we are self-testing for (e.g., a Bell state).
I Definition 4 (Self-testing of tensor product strategies for a single prover, informal). The
correlations p(a, b|x, y) self-test a state |φ〉AB and measurements {M (a)x } on system A and
{N (b)y } on system B if for any state |ψ〉 ∈ H and measurements {P (a,b)x,y }a,b on H that realise
the correlations p(a, b|x, y), there exists an isometry V : H → HA ⊗HB ⊗H′ such that
1. V |ψ〉 = |φ〉AB |Aux〉,
2. V P (a,b)x,y |ψ〉 =
(
(M (a)x ⊗N (b)y )|φ〉AB
)
|Aux〉, for some ancillary state |Aux〉 ∈ H′.
Again, this definition is informal for the same reason as for Definition 3. A formal
statement of such a single-prover self-testing result with a tensor product structure is given
in [27, Theorem 4.38], the main result of our work.
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1.2 Cryptographic primitives
The main cryptographic primitive underlying our self-testing protocol is a so-called extended
noisy trapdoor claw-free function family (ENTCF family). ENTCF families were introduced
by Mahadev in [23], building on the construction of noisy trapdoor claw-free function families
by Brakerski et al. in [8]. Here, we only give a brief informal description of the main
properties of an ENTCF family (see [27, Section 2.2] for references and details).
An ENTCF family consists of two families F and G of function pairs. A function pair
(fk,0, fk,1) ∈ F is called a claw-free pair and is indexed by a public key k. Similarly, an
injective pair is a pair of functions (fk,0, fk,1) ∈ G, also indexed by a public key k. Informally,
the most important properties are the following:
1. For fixed k ∈ KF , fk,0 and fk,1 are bijections with the same image, i.e., for every y in their
image there exists a unique pair (x0, x1), called a claw, such that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) = y.
2. Given a key k ∈ KF for a claw-free pair, it is quantum-computationally intractable
(without access to trapdoor information) to compute both a preimage xi and a single
generalised bit of x0⊕x1 (i.e., d · (x0⊕x1) for any non-trivial bit string d), where (x0, x1)
forms a valid claw. This is called the adaptive hardcore bit property.
3. For fixed k ∈ KG , fk,0 and fk,1 are injective functions with disjoint images.
4. Given a key k ∈ KF ∪KG , it is quantum-computationally hard (without access to trapdoor
information) to determine the “function type”, i.e., to decide whether k is a key for a
claw-free or an injective pair. This is called injective invariance.
5. For every key k ∈ KF ∪ KG , there exists a trapdoor tk, which can be sampled together
with k and with which (ii) and (iv) are computationally easy.
2 Our self-testing protocol
We now give an informal description of our self-testing protocol with the honest prover
behaviour and provide some intuition for its soundness. A full description of the protocol is
given in [27, Figure 1].
On a very high level, one can view the protocol as first executing the RSP protocol
from [19] twice in parallel to prepare two qubits in the provers space. Then, the prover is
asked to perform an entangling operation on these two qubits. Because the prover does not
know which states the qubits are in, and the entangling operation acts differently on different
states, to pass the checks in the protocol the prover has to apply the entangling operation
honestly.
In more detail, the protocol begins with the verifier sampling two uniformly random bits
θ1, θ2, each bit denoting a basis choice (either the computational or the Hadamard basis).
The case where both bits denote the Hadamard basis will be the one where the prover
prepares a Bell pair, whereas the other basis choices serve as tests that prevent the prover
from cheating. Depending on these basis choices, the verifier then samples two key-trapdoor
pairs (k1, tk1) and (k2, tk2) from the ENTCF family: for the computational basis, it samples
an injective pair, and for the Hadamard basis a claw-free pair. The verifier sends the keys to
the prover and keeps the trapdoors private.







Here, X is the domain of the ENTCF family. Note that even though the prover does not
know which kind of function (claw-free or injective) he is dealing with, the definition of
ENTCF families still allows him to construct this state. The prover now measures both
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image registers (i.e., the registers storing “fki,b(x)”), obtains images y1, y2, and sends these
to the verifier. (In the terminology of [23], this is called a “commitment”.) Depending on
the choice of function family by the verifier, the prover’s post-measurement state has one of
two forms: if the verifier sampled the key ki from the injective family, the post-measurement
state is a computational basis state:
|ψ′i〉 = |b〉|xb〉 , (2)
where xb is the unique preimage of yi. If the key ki belongs to a claw-free family, the




(|0〉|x0〉+ |1〉|x1〉) , (3)
where (x0, x1) form a claw, i.e., fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) = y.
At this point, the verifier selects a round type, either a “preimage round” or a “Hadamard
round”, uniformly at random and sends the round type to the prover. For a preimage round,
the honest prover measures his entire state in the computational basis and returns the result;
the verifier checks that the prover has indeed returned correct preimages for the submitted
y1, y2. The preimage round is an additional test that is required for us to leverage the
adaptive hardcore bit property, but we do not discuss this further in this overview.
For a Hadamard round, the honest prover measures both of his preimage registers (i.e.,
the registers containing “xb”) in the Hadamard basis, obtains two bit strings d1, d2, and sends
these to the verifier. This results in the following states (using the notation from above):
|ψ′′i 〉 =
{
|b〉 if ki belongs to an injective family,
1√
2 (|0〉+ (−1)
di·(x0⊕x1)|1〉) if ki belongs to a claw-free family.
(4)
Note that the phase in the second case is exactly the adaptive hardcore bit from the definition
of ENTCF families. At this point, the verifier selects two additional bases q1, q2 uniformly at
random (again from either the computational or Hadamard basis), and sends these to the
prover. In analogy to self-testing, we call these bases “questions”. The honest prover now
applies a CZ gate (an entangling two-qubit gate that applies a σZ operation to the second
qubit if the first qubit is in state |1〉) to its state |ψ′′1 〉|ψ′′2 〉. In the case where both θ1 and θ2
specify the Hadamard basis, this results in a Bell state (rotated by a single-qubit Hadamard
gate). The prover measures the individual qubits of the resulting state in the bases specified
by q1, q2. The outcomes v1, v2 are returned to the verifier.
The verifier can use the prover’s answers y1, y2, d1, d2 and her trapdoor information tk1 , tk2
to determine which state CZ|ψ′′1 〉|ψ′′2 〉 the prover should have prepared. The verifier accepts
the prover if his answers v1, v2 are consistent with making the measurements specified by
q1, q2 on the honest prover’s state CZ|ψ′′1 〉|ψ′′2 〉.
2.1 Soundness proof
We now give a brief intuition for the soundness of the protocol; the full soundness proof is
given in [27, Section 4]. Let us first consider a version of the protocol where the prover is not
supposed to perform a CZ operation. As noted before, this would be (a simplified version
of) the RSP protocol [19], executed twice in parallel. For the purposes of this overview,
let us assume that the only way for the prover to pass these two parallel executions of the
RSP protocol is to treat each execution separately, i.e., use a tensor product Hilbert space
H1 ⊗ H2 and execute each instance of the RSP protocol on a different part of the space
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(enforcing such a tensor product structure is reminiscent of the classic question of parallel
repetition [30] and is actually one of the main difficulties in our soundness proof, but we
leave the details of this for [27, Section 4]). It now follows from the security of the RSP
protocol that the prover must have prepared one of {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} in each part of his
space (up to a “local” change of basis for each space), but he does not know which one.
Now consider how a CZ operation acts on these different states: if both states are
Hadamard basis states (e.g., |+〉|−〉), the CZ operation will entangle them and produce
a Bell state (rotated by a single-qubit Hadamard gate); in contrast, if at least one of the
states is a computational basis state (e.g., |1〉|−〉), the resulting state will still be a product
state of computational and Hadamard basis states (albeit a different one). This means that
in the latter case, the CZ operation essentially only relabels the states. Therefore, if the
verifier adapts her checks to account for the relabelling, in the latter case the guarantees
from the RSP protocol still hold. Because the prover does not know which bases the verifier
has selected, we can extend these guarantees to the case of two Hadamard basis states, too.
We stress that this only provides a rough intuition, and that the actual proof proceeds
quite differently from this because we cannot just assume the existence of a tensor product
structure on the prover’s Hilbert space. Deducing this tensor product structure poses technical
difficulties. In two-prover self-testing proofs, the first step is to show that the measurement
operators used by each prover approximately satisfy certain relations, e.g. anti-commutation.
Because the measurement operators of different provers act on different Hilbert spaces, they
exactly commute. Combining the approximate relations from the first step with the exact
commutation relations, one can show that the prover’s measurement operators must be close
to some desired operators, e.g. the Pauli operators. This last “rounding step” typically uses
Jordan’s lemma or a stability theorem for approximate group representations [20]. In our
case, we cannot show exact commutation relations between operators – commutation can
only be enforced via the protocol, which tolerates a small failure probability. Hence, we
are only able to show approximate commutation relations, which prevents us from applying
Jordan’s lemma or the result of [20]. We therefore develop an alternative approach to
“rounding” the prover’s operators that only requires approximate commutation and leverages
the cryptographic assumptions. This method might also be useful for other applications that
require a very tight “cryptographic leash” on a quantum prover.
3 Discussion
Self-testing has developed into a versatile tool for quantum information processing and
quantum complexity theory and presents one of the strongest possible black-box certific-
ation techniques of quantum devices. The standard self-testing setting involves multiple
non-communicating quantum provers, which is difficult to enforce in practice. The main
contribution of this paper is the construction of a self-testing protocol that allows a classical
verifier to certify that a single computationally bounded quantum prover has prepared a Bell
state and measured the individual qubits of the state in the computational or Hadamard
basis, up to a global change of basis applied to both the state and measurements. This means
that we are able to certify the existence of entanglement in a single quantum device.4
4 The freedom of applying a global change of basis means that the entangled Bell state can be mapped to
a product state. However, then the prover’s measurements are mapped to entangling measurements, so
entanglement is still present.
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Due to the interactive nature of our protocol, this certification remains valid even if it
turned out that any quantum computation is classically simulable, i.e., BQP = BPP.5 It
therefore constitutes a “test of quantumness” in the sense of [8] and differs from proposals
for testing quantum supremacy such as [7], which only certify the “quantumness” of a device
under the assumption that BQP 6= BPP.6
Existing multi-prover self-testing protocols are typically based on non-local games, e.g.,
the CHSH game [25]. Our self-testing protocol follows a more “custom” approach guided by
the available cryptographic primitives. While this enables us to construct a single-prover
self-test for single-qubit measurements on a Bell state, arguably the most important quantum
state for many applications, it does not allow us to extend the result to other states for which
multi-prover self-tests are known [13]. To better make use of the extensive existing self-testing
literature, it would be desirable to construct a procedure that allows for the “translation” of
multi-prover non-local games to single-prover games with computational assumptions. In
classical cryptography, similar attempts have been made to construct single-prover argument
systems from multi-prover proof systems using fully homomorphic encryption [1, 22, 18].
Another approach to constructing single-prover self-tests for a larger class of states might
be to strengthen Mahadev’s measurement protocol [23] from guaranteeing the existence of
a state compatible with the measurement results to certifying that the prover actually has
prepared this state. As a step in this direction, the second author and Zhang recently showed
that Mahadev’s protocol is a classical proof of quantum knowledge [37]. The concept of a
proof of quantum knowledge, first introduced in [10, 15] for the setting of a quantum verifier
and extended to the setting of a classical verifier in [37], is still less stringent than a self-test
and in particular lacks the strong characterisation of the prover’s measurements that we
obtain in self-testing.
Beyond the conceptual appeal of gaining more fine-grained control over untrusted quantum
devices, our self-testing protocol presents a first step towards translating multi-prover
protocols for applications such as delegated computation [32, 14], randomness expansion
[16, 36, 28], or secure multi-party quantum computation [17, 4] to a single-prover setting.
There are already computationally secure single-prover protocols for delegated quantum
computation [23] and randomness expansion [8]; however, establishing a more general link
between self-testing-based multi-prover protocols and computationally secure single-prover
protocols is still desirable: it might lead to conceptually simpler single-prover protocols and
will be useful for constructing single-prover protocols for other applications without resorting
to a low-level cryptographic analysis.
For example, using our self-testing theorem in a black-box way, the first author and
others have recently constructed a protocol for device-independent quantum key distribution
(DIQKD) [26]. In contrast to previous DIQKD protocols, which rely on a non-communication
similar to the one in standard self-testing, this new DIQKD protocol requires no non-
communication assumption and more closely models how DIQKD protocols are expected to
be implemented experimentally. Crucially, the security analysis of this DIQKD protocol can
be reduced to our self-testing theorem without any intricate cryptographic analysis involving
computational hardness assumptions.
5 Note that the LWE assumption is independent of whether BQP = BPP or not, since LWE is assumed
to be hard for both quantum and classical computers.
6 Intuitively, the reason for this is the following: in our protocol and in [8], the quantum prover has to be
able to compute either a preimage or a pair (u, d) such that u = d · (x0 ⊕ x1), where (x0, x1) forms a
claw. If a classical prover was able to correctly compute a preimage or a pair (u, d), it could be rewound
to compute both at the same time, contradicting the adaptive hardcore bit property. In a quantum
prover, the collapsing nature of quantum measurements prevents us from rewinding the prover.
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We believe that, in a similar vein, our protocol will also serve as a useful building block
for other future protocols for computationally bounded quantum devices, in the same way
that self-testing for EPR pairs in the multi-prover scenario has proved to be a versatile tool
in physics, cryptography, and complexity theory.
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